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Melissa C. and Irene V. began living together in California in 2006. They
registered as domestic partners in February 2008. Melissa became pregnant in
June 2008. In October 2008, during the window in which marriage for same-sex
couples was permitted in California, Melissa and Irene married. Melissa assumed Irene's surname. M. was born in March 2009 and named M.C.V. Irene
was present at the birth and cut the umbilical cord.
When you imagine this family interacting with the legal system, perhaps you
think of the plaintiffs in cases arguing for access to marriage-as a lesbian
couple with a child conceived through donor insemination seeking recognition
and protection for the family they have formed out of love and a desire to build
a life together.' Perhaps you wonder, if Melissa dies, will Irene be able to keep
custody in the face of a challenge from, say, Melissa's parents? 2 Or if Irene dies,
will M. be entitled to child benefits from Social Security every month until she
turns eighteen? 3 If you imagine discord between Melissa and Irene down the
road, perhaps you wonder if Melissa might someday take M. to a state that does
not recognize her marriage and claim that she is M.'s only legal parent.4

1. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). Hillary and Julie
Goodridge were lead plaintiffs in the first successful challenge to excluding same-sex couples from

marriage. Id. For a discussion of their family, see Susan Schindehette, Here Come the Brides, PEOPLE
(May 31, 2004), http:llwww.people.comlpeoplelarchive/arficle/0,,20150204,00.html.
2. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459, 529-31
(1990) (discussing In re Pearlman, No. 87-24, 926 DA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 1989)).
3. See Maria Newman, Survivor in Gay Union Appeals Denial of Benefits to Boy, N.Y. TNFS (Oct.
15, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/nyregion/survivor-in-gay-union-appeals-denial-of-

benefits-to-boy.htmil (describing a child's inability to obtain survivor benefits from his mother's
same-sex partner who had not adopted him).
4. See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 337 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
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All of these scenarios are plausible. But the real Irene and Melissa have a
different sort of lesbian family, with a story we have not heard before, at least in
reported cases.
Everything I told you about Melissa and Irene is true. The following is also
true. Their relationship was stormy from the beginning, marked by verbal and
physical abuse. Melissa abused drugs and alcohol. 6 According to Melissa, Irene
struck her with a closed fist, kicked her, and pushed her.7 Melissa also had a
bipolar-disorder diagnosis and a history of involuntary hospitalizations based on
suicidal ideations.8 The couple separated in May 2008, three months after
registering as domestic partners. 9
Melissa began a sexual relationship with Jesus, by whom she became pregnant.' o Melissa filed to dissolve her domestic partnership with Irene in July
2008 and requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the basis of various
incidents of physical violence. 1' The TRO was granted by the court but was
never served on Irene. 12
Melissa lived with Jesus and his family until September 2008, the first
three-to-four months of her pregnancy, and during that time, Jesus assisted her
with prenatal care and other financial support. 13 In early September 2008,
Melissa and Irene reconciled and Melissa left Jesus. 14 On October 15, 2008,
Melissa and Irene were married, and it was into this marriage that M. was born
on March 26, 2009, and brought into Melissa and Irene's home. t5
The likelihood of the above scenario-not necessarily the violence but that a
woman in a same-sex relationship might have sexual intercourse with a man
and thereby become pregnant-is greater than popular narratives of lesbians
having children might suggest. 16 According to demographer Gary Gates, the
2008-2010 General Social Survey shows that 13% of women who identify as

5. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
6. Id. at 864.
7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 861.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 861-62.

13. Id. at 861.
14. Id. at 862.
15. Id. The exact date of M.'s birth is found in Appellant Jesus P.'s Opening Brief at 4, In re M.C.,

123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (No. CK79091).
16. Although not relevant to the issues on appeal, a lesbian mother conceived a child through sexual
intercourse with her ex-boyfriend in In re Adoption of TA.M & E.J.M., 791 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2010). A revision of parentage statutes in Quebec in 2002 explicitly addressed the circumstance of
a lesbian couple planning to raise a child together and conceiving the child through sexual intercourse
of one partner with a man. Under the law, if the intent of all concerned is that the two women will be
the child's parents, then the law recognizes them as parents and does not consider the man a legal
parent. See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have To Adopt Her Own Child: ParentageLaws
for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-first Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 226-29

(2009).
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lesbian have had sex with a man in the last five years; 2% have had sex with a
man in the last year.' 7 Given Gates's estimate of 1.36 million lesbians in the
United States, that latter figure translates into 27,200 lesbians who have slept
with a man in the last twelve months. Adding in the data for bisexual women,
whom Gates numbers at 2.6 million, 18 96% say they have had sex with a man in
the last five years, and 89%-over 2.3 million-say they have had sex with a
man in the last year.' 9
In the 2008-2010 American Community Survey, 2% of women in same-sex
couples reported giving birth to a child in the previous year.20 The 2010 Census
data count 332,887 female same-sex couples, 2' which translates to an estimate
of over 6,600 children born to lesbian couples in a year. While some number of
those births are certainly the result of assisted conception, the General Social
Survey data suggest that many of those children were conceived-intentionally
or unintentionally, with or without a same-sex partner's consent-through sex
with a man.22
So who are M.'s parents? This Response examines that question as a means
of considering the impact of same-sex couples raising children on parentage
presumptions. First, I elaborate on the In re M.C. case by reviewing the facts of
her conception, birth, and infancy 23 and analyzing the court rulings on her
parentage. Then I consider, to use the terminology of Professor William Eskridge, the "default" and the "override" rules for determining the parentage of a
child born to a married lesbian couple.24
The structure of default and override already exists in the presumptions that a
married woman's husband is her child's father and that, in some states, a man's
actions make him a presumptive parent even in the absence of marriage. Those
default rules should apply equally to the female spouse/partner of a lesbian, as

17. E-mail from Gary J. Gates, Williams Distinguished Scholar, UCLA Sch. of Law, to author (Feb.
10, 2012) (on file with author). A 1999 study of 6,935 self-identified lesbians found that 5.7% reported
one or more male sexual contacts in the preceding year. Alison L. Diamant et al., Lesbians' Sexual
History with Men; Implicationsfor Taking a Sexual History, 159 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2730, 2732
(Dec. 13/27, 1999). Women who were not white, were younger than fifty, had not graduated from
college, and had annual income of less than $20,000, were more likely to be in this category. Id.
18. GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., How MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGEN-

DER? 6 (2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-ManyPeople-LGBT-Apr-2011 .pdf.
19. E-mail from Gary J. Gates, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. GARY J. GATES & ABIGAIL M. COOKE, WILLIAMS INST., UNITED STATES CENSUS SNAPSHOT. 2010, at 2
(2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Census2010Snapshot-US-

v2.pdf.
22. E-mail from Gary J. Gates, supra note 17.
23. The facts are taken from the reported appellate opinion and the briefs filed by the parties which,
in several instances, provide information omitted from the trial court ruling.
24. See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of
Menus, Default Rules, and OverrideRules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881 (2012).
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Professor Susan Appleton has thoroughly analyzed.2 5 The notion of override
also exists in the varying state standards for rebutting the parentage presumption
in heterosexual marriages. While Professor Appleton briefly considered when
one of the lesbian spouses might rebut the presumption, she did not address how
the law should respond when the child was conceived through one woman's
sexual relationship with a man and that man attempts to claim parentage. This
Response tackles that question, specifically in the context of In re M.C.-the
first time this issue has arisen in a reported appellate opinion.
Part I presents a detailed account of the In re M.C. facts, relying on the briefs
filed by the parties as well as the contents of the appellate decision. This Part
also explains the reasoning of the trial court, which found that Melissa, Irene,
and Jesus were all M.'s presumed parents, as well as that of the appeals court,
which reversed on that point, holding that a child could not have three parents
and remanding to the trial court to determine who M.'s two parents were. Part II
describes the general principles that should apply to determining M.'s parentage, emphasizing that the principles must apply equally to same-sex and
different-sex couples. Part III examines how Melissa, Irene, and Jesus would be
assessed under some existing laws, and concludes by proposing the best answer
I can discern to the question that drives this Response: who are M's parents?
I. A DETAILED ACCOUNT

OF IN RE M.

C.

This Part presents an in-depth analysis of In re M.C, first going through the
facts and the trial court's finding that M. had three presumed parents and then
examining how the appeals court reversed and remanded to determine which
two of the three possible parents were actually M.'s parents.
A. TRIAL COURT FINDS THREE PRESUMED PARENTS

M.'s time as part of Irene and Melissa's marital family was short lived. The
couple stayed together for only a few weeks after M.'s birth, until April 25, after
which Melissa moved out with the baby. 26 On May 1, Melissa filed for an order

25. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the
Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REv. 227, 232, 237-59 (2006).
26. There is some uncertainty about the date of separation. Irene originally told the Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) that she, Melissa, and M. lived together for three months.
Appellant Melissa V.'s Opening Brief at 14, In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (No.
CK79091). She then testified on January 29, 2010 that her relationship with Melissa ended on April 25,
2009. Id. at 24. Melissa reported that she and Irene separated in June 2009. Id. at 3. But the DCFS brief
on appeal reports that in the earlier custody proceeding between Melissa and Irene, Melissa executed a
declaration stating that Irene had resided with M. only for three weeks. Respondent's Brief at 12, In re
M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (No. CK79091). The court ruling says the couple
lived together for three to four weeks. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
Because the court proceeding to change M.'s last name and Irene's petition for custody began the first
week in May, the late April separation date is more plausible and I use it here. Whether the couple lived
together for one month or three does not change my analysis of the case.
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changing her daughter's last name to "C.", 27 On May 5, Irene filed for custody
and visitation with M. 28 Melissa opposed her request. 29 On May 19, Melissa's
lawyer-who was also her aunt-wrote a letter to Jesus, who had moved to
Oklahoma before M's birth, and asked for his help in Melissa's effort to keep
Irene from obtaining joint custody. 30 On May 26, he was specifically asked to
sign a voluntary declaration of paternity and a statement that he agreed to have
the baby's last name changed to Melissa's. 31 He signed it on June 11, and the
court issued the name-change order the next day. 32 In June, Melissa obtained a
restraining order against Irene.33 On July 13, Irene and Melissa both testified at
a court hearing on Irene's petition for custody and visitation.34 The court issued
a new restraining order against Irene and ordered weekly monitored visitation
35
between Irene and M.
Melissa asked Jesus, who had a full-time job as a grocery store assistant
produce manager, for financial support. In July and August,
he sent her a total of
36
$300. Melissa also began taking M. to see Jesus's family.
So far, this was a private custody dispute between Melissa and Irene. That
changed on September 21.
Melissa had a new boyfriend, Jose. Together they planned for Jose to
confront and scare Irene-and use physical violence if necessary-to get her to
drop her court action over M. 3 8 That day, Jose boarded a bus that Irene was on
and pretended to befriend her. He followed her off the bus and then stabbed her
with a knife in the neck and back, causing critical injuries that required
hospitalization.39 Melissa was arrested and charged as an accessory to the
attempted murder of Irene. 40 M. was turned over to the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and placed in foster
1
care.

4

27. Appellant Jesus P.'s Opening Brief, supra note 15, at 4.
28. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862. The date is found in Appellant Jesus P.'s Opening Brief,
supra note 15, at 4.
29. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862.
30. Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (No. CK

79091).
31. Jesus P.'s Respondent's Brief at 5, In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (No.

CK 79091).
32. Appellant Jesus P.'s Opening Brief, supranote 15, at 5.
33. In reM.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862.
34. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 30, at 9.

35. Id. at 10.
36. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862.
37. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 30, at 10.
38. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863. From a police interview room, Melissa called Jose and told
him, among other things, "'that bitch got what she deserved.' She did not realize it, but she was being
taped at the time. Id.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862.
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Two days later, at the first court hearing, Irene was present and requested that
M. be released to her. The court declined, but it did find her to be a presumed
mother. It also found Jesus to be an alleged father, a status carrying different,
and lesser, legal consequences from those afforded presumed parents.42
DCFS conducted an investigation of M.'s family situation. The DCFS worker
decided that Irene was not a suitable placement for M. for a combination of
reasons. Some of the reasons seem illegitimate, but there was sufficient information to decline releasing M. to Irene at this point.4 3 Jose had not been arrested in
conjunction with the attack on Irene, and the DCFS worker believed Irene
needed to get a restraining order against him, calling this a "major factor"
against placement with her.'" This conclusion seems especially inappropriate
given that with Melissa in custody, there was no reason to believe that Jose
would independently go after Irene. The worker also was unfamiliar with the
of Melissa and Irene's marriage and inquired why Irene did
legal significance
45
not adopt M.
While the above concerns are questionable, other factors did suggest caution
in placing M. with Irene. She did not have her own place to live; she was
sleeping on a living room sofa in the apartment of her mother's female
companion, whom Irene called her step-mother; the apartment might not have
complied with the relevant regulations; and Irene was unemployed and lacked
46
transportation.
Also, Melissa had told the DCFS worker of numerous incidents of Irene's
violence toward her. Irene disputed Melissa's accusations, claiming that one
alleged instance occurred because Melissa had fallen down a flight of stairs
after drinking and that, in general, Melissa had a history of fabricating allegations; a judge did, however, issue a restraining order against Irene.47 Irene also
reported that she thought Jesus had been a one-night stand; she had no idea that
Melissa had temporarily lived with him or sought his financial support, and she
said that
she and Melissa had made a plan to raise the child together as a
48
family.
DCFS also contacted Jesus in Oklahoma, and they learned he had a full-time
job and a pregnant fiancre. 49 He said he wanted to provide a loving and

42. Id. at 863.
43. See id. at 863-64; Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 30, at 13-15.
44. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 30, at 13-15.
45. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863.
46. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 30, at 13-15. The appellate opinion notes that there was
no working refrigerator. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 864. There is some discrepancy in the
information about Irene's residence. The Respondent DCFS's brief says that the DCFS report found
that Irene was living with her mother, who had a history of PCP and methamphetamine use and whose
younger children, Irene's siblings, had been removed from her care. Brief for Respondent, supra note
26, at 11.
47. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 861-62, 864-65.

48. Id. at 865.
49. Id.
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nurturing home for M., something his fianc6e concurred in. 50 He appeared at a
court hearing on October 26, 2009, along with several relatives. 5' Melissa's
parents also appeared in court. 52 Jesus had signed a voluntary declaration of
paternity on October 22, asking to be declared M.'s presumed father, and
Melissa's attorney concurred in this request. 3 Irene's counsel objected, and the
court asked for the matter to be briefed.54 Briefs on this issue were submitted on
November 20. Melissa continued to support Jesus; Irene continued to object;
both the county counsel and the attorney for the child took no definitive position
on the issue.55
While the case was pending, M. was in foster care. Both Melissa's and
Jesus's parents visited her there. Irene also had monitored visitation of two
hours twice a week.56
DCFS convened a meeting in January 2010 attended by Jesus and his mother,
Melissa's parents, and Irene.5 7 DCFS arranged for supervised visits for Jesus
while he was in California, his first contact with now-ten-month-old M. At the
meeting, everyone agreed to temporary placement of M. in the home of
Melissa's parents.5 8
Just before a February court hearing, DCFS changed its recommendation and
advocated that Jesus and Melissa receive joint legal custody, Jesus receive sole
physical custody, and Melissa and Irene receive supervised visitation.59 Melissa's early support of Jesus's parentage came in the context of her efforts to
defeat Irene's parentage claim. 60 Now it was apparent that Jesus's parentage
could result in M.'s placement in Oklahoma. Melissa had obtained a new
attorney in December; 6' at the February hearing, Melissa changed her position
and argued that Irene was M.'s presumed mother and Jesus was not a presumed
62
father.
The court sustained several counts of the petition concerning M. Specifically,
it found that Melissa and Irene had a history of domestic violence that endangered M.'s physical and emotional health and safety; that Melissa remained
incarcerated on charges in conjunction with the attempted murder of Irene and
could not care for M.; and that Melissa had a history of illegal drug use, was a
current marijuana user, and was under the influence of marijuana on the day of
50. Id.
51. Appellant Jesus P.'s Opening Brief, supranote 15, at 10.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 10-11. Melissa did not sign the voluntary declaration of paternity, likely because the form
states that a married woman should not sign it. Id. at 11.
54. Id. at 11-12.
55. Id. at 13.
56. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
57. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 30, at 27.
58. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 866.

59. Id.
60. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 30, at 7.
61. Id. at 26.
62. Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 25.
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her arrest. 63 These facts placed M. at risk of physical and emotional harm and
damage. 64
The court rejected DCFS's placement recommendation and placed M. with
Melissa's parents. The court found Melissa to be M.'s biological mother and
Irene to be her presumed mother based on her marriage to Melissa and because
she received M. into her home and held her out as her own. 65 The court also
found Jesus to be M.'s presumed father, although to do so the court had to make
the debatable finding that he had promptly stepped forward to assume full
parental responsibility
but was thwarted from doing so by the mother or another
66
third party.
The trial court's parentage ruling meant that Melissa, Irene, and Jesus were
all entitled to reunification services.67 Melissa was given visitation while in jail.
Irene was given supervised visits, and Jesus and his mother were given unsupervised, and potentially overnight, visits. 68 California law requires placement with
a presumed parent who was not living with the child at the time of the
conditions placing the child at risk "unless it finds that placement with that
parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child.",69 The court found that a placement with Jesus would
be against M.'s interest in pursuing reunification with Melissa and Irene. 7 °
Melissa and Irene appealed the trial court's finding that Jesus was a presumed
parent, and Jesus appealed the trial court's refusal to place M. with him.7 '
B.

THE APPEALS COURT REVERSES AND REMANDS TO DETERMINE ONLY TWO PARENTS

In addition to the briefs filed on behalf of the three adults, which furthered the
positions each had asserted at trial, the California Court of Appeal received
briefs from an attorney representing M., and an amicus curiae, the Children's
Advocacy Institute (CAI), located at the University of San Diego School of
Law. The brief filed on behalf of M. agreed that Jesus was a presumed father.72
It expressed some skepticism about whether Irene could be a presumed parent
"when there is a very plausible candidate for the role of 'presumed father' in
addition to the biologically presumed mother."' 73 M. did not directly challenge

63. Id. at 27 & n.11.
64. Id.
65. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 30, at 30.
66. See discussion infra section III.C.
67. See In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 866-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding only mothers and
"presumed" parents are entitled to reunification services).
68. Id. at 866.
69. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2(a) (West 2012).
70. Brief for Respondent, supra note 26, at 30.
71. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 867.
72. Brief of Respondent, M.C. at 17, In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (No.
CK79091).
73. Id. at 28.
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the trial court's finding that Irene was a presumed parent, but she did deem that
issue "not a settled question and ... one on which reasonable minds may
differ.",74 M.'s brief concluded that Irene has "a more than colorable claim...
' 75
to status as [M.'s] presumed mother.
Assuming both Jesus and Irene were presumed parents, M. argued that the
claims were complimentary and not in conflict 76 and that M. was "content to
accept the somewhat unprecedented situation of having two presumed mothers
and one presumed father for a total of three presumed parents., 77 M. stated that
if the court nonetheless determined that the presumptions of Irene and Jesus
were in conflict, the case should be sent back to the trial court to resolve the
dispute based on the "weightier considerations of policy and logic" in light of
further evidence to be presented by the parties.7 8 If the court determined, on the
other hand, to resolve the conflict on the 79present record, M. argued that the
record supported Jesus's claim over Irene's.
Amicus curiae CAI urged an unequivocal affirmance of the trial court ruling
that M. had three parents, "each of whom has legal rights and obligations with
respect to her, and with each of whom she is entitled to a have a parent-child
relationship." 80 CAI argued that the parentage statute left open the possibility
that "two or more presumptions may arise that do not conflict with each
other"8 ' "In order to determine whether or not two parental presumptions are,
in fact, in conflict with each other, the Court must look at whether or not it is
in
82
the child's best interest to limit the number of parents available to the child.,
Ultimately, CAI argued that the trial court had properly determined that M.'s
best interests were served by having three parents and that "[c]ourts must be
allowed flexibility to consider the unique factual circumstances presented in
each case, and to recognize and respect the rights of all such individuals who
83
can establish a legally cognizable parental relationship to a child.
The appeals court disagreed, stating that the California Supreme Court had
consistently refused to find two mothers or two fathers for a child if to do so
would result in three parents.84 Under California Family Code § 7610, Melissa
is a parent because the parent and child relationship between a child and the
natural mother "may be established by proof of her having given birth to the

74. Id.
75. Id. at 31.
76. Id. at 32.
77. Id. at 33-34.
78. Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id. at 36.
80. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Children's Advocacy Institute in Support of Respondent M.C. at 1,
In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (No. CK79091).

81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 7-8.
84. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 877.
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child."' 85 The appeals court agreed with the lower court that both Jesus and Irene
were presumed parents.86
Because the court held that the child could not have three parents, it remanded the case and instructed the trial court to reduce M.'s parents from three
to two, using the statutory mandate for resolving conflicting parentage presumptions. 87 That mandate-deriving from the original 1973 Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA) on which California based its law-tells the court that "the presumption
which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and
logic controls.",88 Notably, the appeals court did not say that the trial court had
to choose between Jesus and Irene. Rather, it characterized Melissa as a
"presumed parent ' 89 and implied that the trial court, in reducing M.'s parents
from three to two, could eliminate Melissa and retain Irene and Jesus. 90
This characterization of Melissa was possible because California law extends
the "policy and logic" standard for resolving conflicting parentage claims
beyond that provided in the 1973 UPA. In 2006, in Amy G. v. M. W., a California
appeals court ruled that the parentage of a biological mother, Kim, could not be
challenged by Amy, the woman who was married to the child's biological father
and had lived with the child and held her out as her own. 9 ' Amy had asked the
court to choose between her and Kim under California Family Code § 7612(b),
which instructed the court to weigh "policy and logic" based on the facts.9 2 The
court ruled that § 7612(b) could not be used against a mother who is a legal
parent because she gave birth to the child; that parent's status derives from
California Family Code § 7610. 9 3 In direct response, the California legislature
amended § 7612(b) so that the same weighing of policy and logic applies to a
conflict between a presumptive parent and a person claiming parentage under
§ 7610-in other words, a birth mother.94 Because Melissa's parentage derives
from California Family Code § 7610, § 7612(b) as currently written does appear
to give the trial court the authority to weigh "policy and logic" when presumptive parentage, such as that of Jesus and Irene, conflicts with her claim. In re
M. C. says as much.9 5
Thus, the appeals court remanded the case to the juvenile court to apply the
"policy and logic" standard "to resolve the conflicting fact-intensive presumptions as between the three parents." 96 The trial court was also instructed to

85. CAL. F.Am. CODE § 7610(a) (West 2012).
86. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 877.
87. Id. at 878.
88. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2012).
"In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 877.
89. "M.C. does have three presumed parents ....
90. Id.
91. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 304-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
92. Id. at 305-06.
93. Id.
94. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2012).
95. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
96. Id. at 877.
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consider the circumstances as they had developed in the fifteen months since M.
was placed with her maternal grandparents.9 7
So who are M.'s parents? And who should they be? Borrowing the language
of Professor Eskridge's template, when a lesbian couple is married and one
spouse bears a child, what is the default rule and what is the override?
II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Before answering this question, I offer general principles of determining
parentage that transcend this particular factual situation.
A. A CHILD CAN HAVE THREE PARENTS

The In re M.C. court believed it was bound by California Supreme Court
precedent to hold that a child could not have two fathers or two mothers where a
determination of dual maternity or paternity would result in the child having
three parents. 98 As a broad statement that a child cannot have three parents, this
is an incorrect reading of California law. California trial courts have granted
adoptions that result in a child having three parents. 99 Although there is no
appellate court ruling on the issue, there is also nothing in California statutes or
case law that precludes a judge from allowing an adoption that does not

terminate the rights of either biological parent when such an arrangement is in
the child's best interests.
Also, although uncommon, statutes and case law in other jurisdictions acknowledge that a child may have three parents.' ° The In re M.C. court could have
ruled that this child did not have three parents without characterizing the law
over broadly.
B. THE RULES FOR DETERMINING PARENTAGE SHOULD BE THE SAME FOR
DIFFERENT-SEX AND SAME-SEX COUPLES

Every year, tens of thousands of children are born to married women who
have conceived through sexual intercourse with men other than their husbands.'' State statutes and case law, model statutes, and constitutional law all
must take account of this fact. There is no uniformity in approaches to determining a child's parentage under this circumstance. In other words, it is by no
means clear or consistent across the country who would be M.'s parents if Irene
had been Ivan and he had been Melissa's spouse.
As a general principle, the response to this question must be the same
whether the couple is heterosexual or lesbian. It is of course true that a female

97. Id.

98. Id.
99. See Polikoff, supra note 16, at 243.
100. See id. at 243-46.
101. See id. at 213 & n.38.
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spouse will always know that she is not the biological parent of her spouse's
child. A male spouse will not always know this. When a husband does know
this fact, however, the law considers it relevant in numerous contexts. At the
very least there must be parity of treatment between a female spouse and a male
spouse who knows he is not his child's biological parent.
C. GENETIC CONNECTION IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR SUFFICIENT
FOR LEGAL PARENTAGE

Assisted conception produces parents with no genetic connection to their
child. So does adoption. Statutes and case law recognize a nonbiological parent
based on that person's marriage to a woman who bears a child or that person's
consent to a woman's insemination with the intent that both persons will be the
parents of the resulting child.' 0 2 The principle that a genetic connection to a
child is not necessary to find someone a legal parent means that Irene and M.
cannot be denied a parent-child relationship on the basis of a lack of genetic
connection.
The U.S. Supreme Court has approved state statutes that deny parentage
when the link to the child is based on biology alone.10 3 As a constitutional
matter, it is clear that genetic connection is not sufficient to find legal parentage.
Although some states do allow a biological father to claim parentage on that
basis alone when the mother is married to another man, that is not the right
answer.' 0 4 If biology rebuts a parentage presumption, then a couple-gay or
straight-committed to raising a child together in a family unit can be denied
the opportunity to provide that stable structure for the child. It would mean that
even if Irene and Melissa comprised a family unit of two fit parents, Jesus
would have the ability to disrupt that unit.
California itself rejects this approach. In Dawn D. v. Superior Court, the
mother, Dawn, left her husband, Frank, in January and moved in with another
man, Jerry, until April, when she returned to her husband.' 0 5 In August, Jerry
filed a petition to establish a parental relationship with Dawn's unborn child.
Dawn gave birth to a son in November.' °6

102. See Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Cal. 1998) (supporting the marital
presumption). For consent to insemination, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2012) and In re
Parentageof M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (111. 2003).
103. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983) (approving state law requiring more than
"the mere existence of a biological link" for parental rights of nonmarital putative father who lacked

any other relationship with the child).
104. Compare J.S.A. v. M.H., 797 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (allowing alleged biological

father to seek paternity of three-year-old child being raised by mother and her husband), with Merkel v.
Doe, 635 N.E.2d 70, 72 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1993) (holding statute that allowed alleged biological father
to bring paternity action for child born to mother married to another man unconstitutional as a violation
of the married couple's right as a family unit).
105. Dawn D., 952 P.2d at 1140.
106. Id.
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Frank was the presumed father of the child both because he was married to
Dawn when the child was born and because he received the child into his home
and held the child out as his natural child." 7 California statutes denied Jerry
standing to challenge Frank's paternity. Jerry argued that the statutes were
unconstitutional because they denied him the opportunity to develop a relationship with his biological child.' 08
In a 5-2 ruling, the California Supreme Court rejected this argument and held
that Jerry did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in developing
a relationship with the child.' 9 Three of the justices, in a concurrence, emphasized that this child was born to a woman who was part of an intact marital
family." 0 The concurrence admonished that "[a man who] fathers a child with a
woman married to another man takes the risk that the child will be raised within
that marriage and that he will be excluded from participation in the child's
life."' i
D. MARRIAGE IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR SUFFICIENT FOR LEGAL PARENTAGE

For most of history, the marriage of a man to a woman bearing a child was
both necessary and sufficient to make him a legal parent. That is no longer the
law. Without being married to the woman bearing the child, a man can be the
child's legal parent because, among other reasons, he is a genetic parent, he held
the child out as his own, he signed an acknowledgement of parentage, he
commissioned a child born to a surrogate, or he consented to the woman's
1 2
insemination in writing with the intent to parent the resulting child. '
The same pathways should be available to a woman who is not married to a
woman who bears a child. Numerous states, including California, provide such
pathways. "3 Irene was M.'s presumed parent based on her marriage to Melissa,
but she was also M.'s presumed parent because M. lived with her and she held
M. out as her child.' 4 Although this case concerns a married lesbian couple, I
am a vehement critic of any scheme for determining parentage in lesbian-couple
families that produces two legal parents when the couple is married but only
one legal parent when they are not." 15

107. Id. at 1141.
108. Id. at 1142.

109. Id. at 1146.
110. Id. at 1147-48 (Kennard, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 1148.
112. Nancy D. Polikoff, The New "Illegitimacy": Winning Backward in the Protection of the
Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 721, 729-30 (2012) (citations

omitted).
113. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005).
114. See id. (concluding that lesbian partner was the presumed mother of nonbiological children

because she received children into her home and held them out as her own).
115. See Polikoff, supra note 112, at 722-23.
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Ill. WHO ARE M.'s PARENTS? EVALUATING MELISSA, IRENE, AND JESUS
This section assesses the claims to parentage of Melissa, Irene, and Jesus. I
consider the above principles, existing California law, and the range of approaches that might govern such an assessment in other states.
A. MELISSA

Under California Family Code § 7610, Melissa is M.'s parent because she
gave birth to her."16 She is both the genetic and the birth mother of the child.
She did not conceive the child under a contractual surrogacy arrangement to
relinquish the child, even if such an agreement would be enforceable.
The In re M.C. appeals court, however, gave Melissa no greater claim to M.
than that of Irene or Jesus." 7 Rather, the appeals court instructed the trial court
to follow California Family Code § 7612(b) and resolve the conflicting claims
of the three adults based on the "weightier considerations of policy and logic."ll
This appears to be an error of constitutional proportion. Melissa may be a
drug addict and she may be guilty of a felony for planning an action that
resulted in a serious assault on Irene, but her legal status as M.'s mother should
be altered only if a court terminates her parental rights pursuant to a statutory
scheme designed (rightfully) to make that difficult. '9 Melissa is a parent, not a
presumed parent. A presumption of parentage can be rebutted; if it is, then the
person is not a parent and cannot assert constitutional rights as a parent.
Parentage, as opposed to presumptive parentage, is not something that can be
rebutted; it is a status that carries the full weight of constitutional protection.
Proof of unfitness by clear and convincing evidence can result in a termination of parental rights, but the In re M.C. trial court did not find Melissa unfit.
The appeals court did not disturb that finding, noting that "no individual
claiming parental status has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to be
unfit to retain his or her status."' 20 It may be that the facts presented on remand,
well over a year after the trial court's initial determination of parentage, would
show Melissa unfit by clear and convincing evidence. By that time the court
would know the disposition of the criminal charges against her, her amenability
to substance abuse and mental-health treatment, and the extent and quality of
her contact with M. But the appeals court, denominating all three adults
presumed parents, did not instruct the trial court to judge Melissa according to
that standard.

116. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 2012).
117. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
118. Id.
119. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-70 (1982) (holding that parental rights could not be
terminated without proving the substantive standard by clear and convincing evidence).
120. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 877.
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B. IRENE

1. California
The trial and appeals courts agree that Irene is M.'s presumed parent because
she was married to Melissa when M. was born. The trial court also held that she
was a parent because she received M. into her home and held her out as her
own.
California adopted the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), which includes a
presumption of parentage for a man who "receives the child into his home and
openly holds out the child as his natural child."'' 2 1 The statute also makes
provisions for determining paternity applicable
to determining a mother-child
122
relationship "[ilnsofar as practicable."'
Interpreting this latter section in Elisa B. v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court read its "holding out" provision in a gender-neutral fashion and
found a lesbian birthmother's ex-partner a presumptive parent of the children
they had raised together. 123 The court subsequently ruled in Charisma R. v.
KristinaS. that a holding-out parent need not have lived with the child for any
set minimum of time for the presumption to attach.1 24 Finding Irene a presumed
parent was an unexceptional
application of the above cases. No one challenged
25
this finding on appeal. 1
2. The Legal Framework in Other Jurisdictions
Across the United States, there are a small number of other states where the
"holding out" standard would make Irene a legal parent and fifteen where her
formalized status, called marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership, would
also make her a presumed parent. There are two other legal regimes that turn a
birth mother's same-sex partner into a legal parent in the absence of an
adoption. In four states both women are legal parents when they jointly plan for
a child conceived through donor insemination. In at least two states, legal
parentage derives from meeting specified de facto parentage criteria. Although I
review these in this section, Irene would not qualify as a parent under either of
these theories. M. was not born through donor insemination, and the short
period of time Irene lived with M. makes a finding of de facto parentage
unlikely.
a. Holding Out. Reasoning identical to that of California is plausible in any
state containing both the "holding out" presumption and the gender-neutral

121. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (2005).
122. Id. § 7650(a).
123. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005).
124. Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
125. In apparent contradiction of the reasoning of Elisa B., the In re M.C. appeals court expressed in
a footnote substantial skepticism about whether the UPA should be read in a gender-neutral fashion. See
In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 872.
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application provision of the 1973 UPA. The UPA was revised in 2002. It
continues the holding out presumption in a modified form. The 2002 UPA
presumes that a man is the father of a child if "for the first two years of the
child's life, he resided in the same household with the child and openly held out
the child as his own."' 126 The gender-neutral-reading provision has been simplified to state, "Provisions of this [Act]27 relating to determination of paternity
apply to determinations of maternity."'
Although no other state court has adopted the reasoning of Elisa B. in a case
involving a lesbian couple, Colorado, which has adopted the 1973 UPA, has
applied its holding-out presumption to an unmarried man who raised a child
28
with his female partner knowing that he was not the child's biological father.'
In a subsequent case, a Colorado court applied the gender-neutral-reading
provision to find that the wife of a biological father could be a presumptive
parent. 129 Irene would therefore be a presumed parent in Colorado.
The Delaware Supreme Court indicated that it would make such a finding as
well in an appropriate case. In Smith v. Gordon, a woman had raised an adopted
child with her partner, but the partner was the only person who had legally
adopted the child.1 30 Delaware had adopted the 2002 UPA. The couple split up
thirteen months after the child came into their home, so the nonadoptive mother
had not held out the child as her own for two years as required in the 2002 UPA.
The court noted that "had Gordon resided with [the child] for at least two years
after the adoption and held [the child] out as her child during that time, she
would have been able to establish a legal parent-child relationapparently
131
ship."
In those states with the holding-out presumption but not the gender-neutralreading provision, a court could read the holding-out provision as gender
neutral as a matter of statutory interpretation or could find it an unconstitutional
gender-based classification and extend the provision to female holding-out
parents as a remedy.
b. Formalized Relationship. In a jurisdiction that recognizes a formal status
between two women that grants all the state-based consequences of marriage,
whether it is called marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership, the birth
mother's partner/spouse is a presumed parent. Seven jurisdictions allow same-

126. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002).
127. Id. § 106 (alteration in original). Five states have adopted both portions of the 2002 UPA. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-106 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204 (West 2012); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-11A-106 (West 2012); N.M. STAr. ANN. § 40-11A-204 (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-20-06 (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-10 (West 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.106
(West 2012); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West 2012); Wyo. Swxr. ANN. § 14-2-406 (West
2011); Wyo. STAr.ANN. § 14-2-504 (West 2011).
128. See In re the Parental Responsibilities of A.D., 240 P.3d 488, 490-92 (Colo. App. 2010).
129. See In re S.N.V., No. 10CA1302, 2011 WL 6425562, at *2 (Colo. App. Dec. 22, 2011).
130. Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 3 (Del. 2009).
131. Id. at 7-8.
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sex couples to marry. 132 Nine have civil unions or statewide domestic partnership.133 A typical civil union or comprehensive domestic-partnership statute
contains the following language:
The rights and obligations of domestic partners with respect to a child of
either of them are the same as those of spouses. The rights and obligations of
former or surviving domestic partners with respect to 34
a child of either of them

are the same as those of former or surviving spouses.'

Irene and Melissa were registered as domestic partners. Although Melissa
petitioned to dissolve it, she did not follow through on that. When they
reconciled, they married. Their marriage made Irene a presumed parent, but
even if they had not married, their domestic partnership would have made her a
presumed parent.

Had the couple never reconciled, Irene's status as a presumptive parent based
on the domestic partnership would have been rebuttable based on their separation. The fact that they not only reconciled but also married, knowing that
Melissa was pregnant, suggests that they wanted to emphasize their commitment to each other and their joint commitment to the child as well.
c. De Facto Parent. A partner can also become a parent under state schemes
that assign such a status to a de facto parent. Two examples are Washington,

which does so by court ruling derived from common law analysis, and Delaware, which does so by statute. Notably, qualifying as a de facto parent creates
not a presumption of parentage but legal parentage itself.
In In re LB., the Washington Supreme Court held that a woman who planned
for the child with her ex-partner and raised the child with her for six years stood
in "legal parity" to the child's biological mother. 35 The nonbiological mother
met the de-facto-parent test containing the following elements:
(1) [T]he natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like
relationship, (2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same
household, (3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood without
expectation of financial compensation, and (4) the petitioner has been in a

132. Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Iowa, New Hampshire, New York, Massachusetts, and
Vermont. Two states, Maryland and Washington, have passed marriage-equality laws, but they are not
in effect and face a possible referendum. See Summary of Laws Regarding Same-Sex Couples, NA'L
CmR. FOR. LEsBiAN RTs. (2012), http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/Relationship-Recognition-

StateLawsSummary.pdf.
133. California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon,
Rhode Island, and Washington. See id.
134. NEv. REv. STAr. § 122A.200(1)(d) (2009).
135. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005).
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parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established
with the child a
36
bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature.'
The court also limited recognition as a de facto parent to a person who has
"fully and completely undertaken a permanent,
unequivocal, committed, and
1 37
responsible parental role in the child's life."
In 2009, Delaware amended its version of the Uniform Parentage Act to add a
de facto parent. A person who meets the statutory test is a parent, with a status
identical to a mother who gives birth to or adopts a child. The definition of de
facto parent is one who:
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child's parent or parents who
fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
between the child and the de facto parent;
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child as that term is defined
in § 1101 of this title; and
(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have
established a bonded
and dependent relationship with the child that is
38
parental in nature.'
"Parental responsibilities" are defined as "the care, support and control of the
child in a manner that provides for the child's necessary physical needs,
including adequate food, clothing and shelter, and that also139provides for the
mental and emotional health and development of such child."'
It is unlikely that Irene would be a parent under either Washington or
Delaware law. Melissa left Irene when the child was less than a month old, and
Irene filed for custody shortly thereafter. The length-of-time requirement would
likely prevent any same-sex partner from qualifying as a parent if she lived with
the child for that period of time. In fact, it is a shortcoming of the de-factoparent basis for establishing parentage that when a couple plans for a child
together, and the nonbiological mother fully participates in the processsomething that did not happen here-she cannot meet the test until some period
after the child's birth, leaving the child initially with only one legal parent.
The requirement of consent from the child's parents also raises the question
of whether Jesus would qualify as a parent whose support and consent would be
required before a determination of de facto parent status could be made. That
issue has yet to be decided by any court.
136. Id. at 176. This test was originally developed in Wisconsin as the legal standard for granting
visitation to a nonbiological lesbian mother. See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421
(Wis. 1995).
137. In re Parentageof LB., 122 P.3d at 177 (quoting C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me.
2004)).
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2009).
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1101(10) (West 2012).
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d. Consent to Insemination. By statute in three jurisdictions-the District of
Columbia, 4° New Mexico, 41 and Washington142-and by court decision in
one-Oregon 4 3-a woman who consents to her partner's insemination with
donor semen with the intent to be a parent is a parent of the child. The statutes
use language similar to that in the American Bar Association Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology (ABA Model Act). Section 603
of that Act reads: "An individual who ... consents to ... assisted reproduction
by a woman as provided in [this Act] with the intent to be a parent of her child
is a parent of the resulting child."' 44 The ABA Model Act improved on the
similar provision of the 2002 UPA
which, although marital-status neutral, used
"man" rather than "individual." 14 5
Because conception in In re M.C. did not occur through donor insemination,
those statutes are irrelevant to a determination of Irene's status.
3. Summary
A review of these avenues to parentage for the same-sex partner of a woman
who bears a child demonstrates that, under any existing legal regime, Irene
cannot be more than a presumed parent. This is appropriate. She did not
participate in the decision to bring M. into the world. And she did not function
as a parent for a long enough period to deserve the status of legal parent on that
basis alone, whether that is looked at from the perspective of the biological
mother's constitutional right to raise her child or the child's need for continuity
with someone she considers a parent. Importantly, the same result would ensue
if Melissa had married a man. He too would obtain no more than the status as
presumed parent.
The status of being a presumed parent by definition means that there is some
circumstance under which the presumption can be rebutted. Irene's parentage is
not absolute. Rebuttal of the presumption is fact specific, as I discuss more fully
in my conclusion.' 46 Courts are reluctant to rebut the presumption when the
child will be left with only one parent, but that is not the case here.

140. D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1) (West 2009).
141. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (West 2010).
142. WASH. REv. CODE. § 26.26.7 10 (West 2011).
143. Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 39-40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
144. ABA MODEL Acr GOVERNNG AssisTan REPROD. TECH. § 603 (2008), availableat http://abanet.org/
family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
145. UNIF. PARENTAGE Act § 201(b)(5) (amended 2002). Of course, because § 106 of the 2002 UPA
authorizes a gender-neutral reading of the Act, a court could rule that, although this section uses "man,"

it must also be read to encompass a woman who consents to assisted reproduction by a woman with the
intent to be a parent of the resulting child. For purposes of inheritance and intestate succession, the
2008 Uniform Probate Code has a gender- and marital-status-neutral definition of parentage of a child
born through assisted conception. The comments to the section explicitly reference same-sex couples
and state that the nonbirth mother becomes the child's parent by operation of this section. UNiw. PROBATE

CODE § 2-120(f) cmt. (amended 2008).
146. See infra Conclusion.
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In her extensive analysis of the basis for the marital presumption, Professor
Susan Appleton stresses the functional role played by a pregnant woman's
partner during the pregnancy. She sees the presumption
not as [an] assumption of the husband's probable genetic connection to the
child. Instead, the presumption today reflects the belief that someone legally
connected to the woman bearing the child likely planned for the child,
demonstrated a willingness to assume responsibility, or provided support
(emotional and/or
economic) during the pregnancy, in turn supporting the
147
expected child.
Irene did all of the above except plan for the child with Melissa, but there is a
long history of men stepping up to marry a woman pregnant by a different man
with the intent to consider that child his own in every way. Irene should get as
much credit as such a man would receive.
C. JESUS

1. California
Unlike many states, California statutorily defines the circumstances under
which an adult is entitled to reunification services as a parent of a child placed
in foster care. Specifically, the California Family Code distinguishes between
"presumed fathers" and "alleged fathers." The former get reunification services
and the latter do not.1 4 8 That is the context in which a determination of M.'s
parentage arose.
Given that Jesus's home looked like it might provide the greatest stability and
nurturance to M., it is no surprise that the trial court wanted Jesus to receive
reunification services. Unfortunately, and unnecessarily to achieve the possibility of M.'s placement with Jesus, the trial court, in a ruling affirmed on appeal,
misapplied the prevailing legal standard to the facts of this case.
Jesus was not a presumed father under the statute. Melissa and Jesus did not
marry or attempt to marry each other, before or after M.'s birth, and Jesus never
received M. into his home, so he could not meet the requirement that he
"receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural
child." ' 49 Those are the only ways to be a presumed father.
But California also has a category of men called Kelsey S. fathers. In a 1992
case, the California Supreme Court ruled that the category of men whose
consent to a child's adoption was required had to extend beyond presumed
fathers.' 50 In Adoption of Kelsey S., a mother consented to placement of her

147.
148.
149.
150.

Appleton, supra note 25, at 285-86 (citation omitted).
In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 356, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
CAL. FAm. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2005).
Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236-37 (Cal. 1992).
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child for adoption immediately upon the child's birth. The alleged biological
father, Rickie, disagreed with this plan from the moment he heard of it and, two
days after the child's birth, filed a petition to establish his parentage. Prospective adoptive parents filed a petition to adopt the child.
Rickie was an alleged, rather than a presumed, father. He could not be a
presumed father because he never received the child into his home. As an
alleged father, the California Family Code gave him a hearing at which he could
object to the adoption but gave the court the authority to order the adoption
against his wishes upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
adoption was in the child's best interests. Had he been a presumed father, the
adoption could have
occurred only upon proof by clear and convincing evidence
15
of his unfitness. 1
The California Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the statutory
scheme and determined that, as applied to alleged fathers who met particular
criteria, the statute was unconstitutional. 52 The court reasoned that the statute
improperly placed the unmarried father's ability to be a parent solely within the
hands of the mother; she could refuse to marry him and could place the child for
adoption without ever allowing him to receive the child into his home. If a man
"promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental
responsibilities-emotional, financial, and otherwise," the court ruled that the
mother could not unilaterally
block him from obtaining constitutionally pro53
status.1
parental
tected
The court identified those factors relevant to determining if a father promptly
demonstrated the full commitment to parent. The factors include his pre- and
post-birth conduct:
Once the father knows ... of the pregnancy, he must promptly attempt to
assume his parental responsibilities as fully as the mother will allow and his
circumstances permit. In particular, the father must demonstrate "a willingness himself to assume full custody of the child-not merely to block
adoption by others." A court should also consider the father's public acknowland birth expenses... and prompt
edgement of paternity, payment of pregnancy
54
legal action to seek custody of the child. 1
The Kelsey S. criteria now serve to make an alleged father entitled to
reunification services in a dependency action.1 55 The In re M.C. appeals court
defined a Kelsey S. father as: "[A]n unwed biological father who comes forward at the first opportunity to assert his paternal rights after learning of his
child's existence, but has been prevented from becoming a statutorily presumed

151. Id. at 1218.
152. Id. at 1236.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1237-38 (internal citations omitted).
155. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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father.., by the
unilateral conduct of the child's mother or a third party's
56
interference."
Jesus's provision of care and support during four months of Melissa's pregnancy certainly matter in assessing his Kelsey S. status. So does the $300 he
sent to Melissa in the summer of 2009. But the key fact that bumps an alleged
father into the category of presumed father is that the mother or a third party
unilaterally prevented the father from asserting parental rights.
Melissa had unilateral control over whether she married Jesus. The question
is whether Melissa's or a third party's conduct kept Jesus from receiving M. into
his home. It was obvious in Kelsey S. that the mother did this; she placed the
child, upon birth, with adoptive parents. 157 Melissa and Jesus's situation is
different.
Jesus did not forego filing a parentage action, which would have adjudicated
his right to a relationship with M., because of Melissa's unilateral acts. Melissa
did make the unilateral decision to return to Irene. She did not give Jesus an
address to contact her, and she lost her phone "within weeks" of when she left
him. But Jesus did not allege that he tried to call her before she lost her phone.
Melissa and Jesus had met through the Internet, and Jesus did not allege that he
tried and failed to reach her that way. It was uncontested that he knew where
Melissa's parents lived, and he did not contact them either to reach Melissa or to
obtain any information about her pregnancy or the child's birth.' l 8
If Jesus wished to have a relationship with M. upon her birth, he could have
taken steps to locate Melissa. He did not. Instead, he moved to Oklahoma
before the child's birth. This was his unilateral decision and an action that he
knew would remove him from the ability to have regular contact with his child.
The court considered Jesus's residence in Oklahoma as a circumstance that
justified his failure to do more to establish a relationship with the child. The
court considered the financial, time, and distance constraints of his job and his
commitment to his pregnant fiancee as circumstances that prevented him from
coming to California.15 9 This overlooked entirely that Jesus chose to move to
Oklahoma knowing full well that Melissa was pregnant with his child. His
distance from the child is not a circumstance caused by any act of Melissa or
anyone else.
Jesus told the trial court that "it was always his intent to be a father to [the
child], regardless of his relationship with Melissa.""l6 Although that may have
been his subjective intent, his move to Oklahoma coupled with his failure to
reach out to Melissa's family during the pregnancy or after the probable date of
M.'s birth contradict that intent.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 869.
Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P2d at 1217.
In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 875-76.
Id.
Brief for Respondent Jesus P., supra note 31, at 15.
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It well may be that Jesus was satisfied with Melissa's decision to raise the
child with Irene and did not want to interfere with that. The court characterizes
this possibility as follows:
While Jesus might have hunted Melissa down, and forcefully interjected
himself into the relationship between Melissa and Irene, it is also possible to
conclude he chose not to do so, and instead decided to allow an emotionally
fragile woman the space she needed so that she could return to a relationship
in which she felt "more6 1comfortable," and complete her pregnancy as free
from stress as possible.'
To the extent this reasoning suggests Jesus made a decision that was good for
Melissa and the baby because it reduced stress during the pregnancy, it cannot
justify his move to Oklahoma and his failure to contact Melissa or her family
after the baby was due. To the extent this reasoning suggests Jesus made a
considered and understandable decision to forego a relationship with his child,
its use to support his Kelsey S. status is disingenuous. However reasonable this
decision, it was his, not Melissa's or that of any third party. A decision to walk
away and allow a child to be raised by her mother and a different partner is a
decision to abrogate, not assert, parental responsibility.
Because Melissa's lawyer contacted Jesus when M. was less than two months
old, he could not even make a claim that he did not know M.'s whereabouts
from that time on. 162 Wanting full custody is one element of the Kelsey S.
standard. 163 Although Jesus sent Melissa $300 in three installments, he gave no
indication of any interest in custody at all.1 64 He did ask that Melissa take the
baby to see his family, but Kelsey S. is clear that it is the father's interest in full
custody that counts, not his interest in having the child be a part of his extended
family.
The court made something of the fact that, because Melissa asked him to sign
a declaration of paternity, Jesus might have reasonably believed that he did not
have to do anything more than that to establish paternity. 165 But nowhere does 66a
man's belief about what makes him a legal father turn him into a legal father. 1
The Kelsey S. test justifies a man's failure to meet the statutory definition of a
presumed father. If the court starts justifying a man's failure to meet the Kelsey
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 876.
Id. at 876 n.12.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 862.
Id. at 876 n.12.

166. Nor does a woman's belief about what makes her a legal mother turn her into a legal mother.
For example, Michele Hobbs learned this when the Ohio Supreme Court refused to enforce the
numerous documents signed by her former partner denominating Michele a parent of the six-year-old
daughter they had planned for and raised together. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 308-09 (Ohio 2011).
Elizabeth Stem learned it when the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the agreement between her
husband and Melissa Whitehead in the first disputed surrogate mother case in the U.S. In re Baby M.,
537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988).
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S. standard, it makes the statutory distinction between a presumed father and an
alleged father meaningless.
The court's faulty reasoning in In re M.C. does not lead to the conclusion that
Jesus could or should have no role in M.'s life. There is a chance that further
factual development would show that Jesus should have custody of the child.
But the court should not have misapplied Kelsey S. to reach that result, and it
did not have to.
Jesus could have filed a paternity action even after the child came into DCFS
custody. 167 The California Supreme Court has held that an alleged biological
father cannot challenge the parentage of a husband who is going to raise a child
with his wife. 168 Assuming application of that principle to a woman planning to
raise a child with her wife, Jesus could have filed because Melissa and Irene
split up shortly after the child's birth.
The flaws in the court's reasoning are most clearly unmasked by considering
what would have happened if Melissa had placed M. for adoption at the time
she left Irene. No court would have found Jesus a Kelsey S. father. A court
would not have needed to find him unfit to grant the adoption; it would have
made a decision based on M.'s best interests alone. Jesus might have been
successful under that standard, but not because he was a Kelsey S. father. The
same standard would have applied had Melissa and Irene filed a petition for
Irene to adopt M.; Jesus could have blocked that adoption only if he could show
it would not be in the child's best interests. Irene and Melissa would not need to
show Jesus's unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.
The misapplication of Kelsey S. is also troubling because it may derive from
overvaluing not only biology but fatherhood. The concurring judge in In re
M.C. agreed with the majority's reading of Kelsey S., concluding that there was
no evidence to support rebutting Jesus's parentage and that M. should have been
placed with him immediately.1 69 The judge noted that "M.C. has been separated
from Jesus for too long already, and continuing delays do not benefit her."17
The language of separation in that sentence implies that Jesus and M. were
together at some point, something that is not accurate. The judge also failed to
discuss at all the facts that supported a finding of parentage in Irene. This
silence suggests that once a presumptive father is established the inquiry ends. I
find it unlikely that the concurring judge would have reasoned in this fashion
had Melissa's spouse been a man asserting his status as a presumptive father.
2. Other Legal Standards That Might Apply to Jesus
States diverge widely on whether and when they allow a biological father to
file for paternity of a child born to a married woman. A full examination of the
167. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 316.2(d) (2001).
168. Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Cal. 1998).
169. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 879-80 (Rothschild, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
170. Id. at 880.
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range of state statutes and court rulings is beyond the scope of this Response.1 7 1
In this section, I conclude that Jesus does not have a constitutional right to be
declared M.'s parent. Thus, a state may weigh the interests involved and assign
parentage to best achieve those interests. First, I address the impact of the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Michael H. v. Gerald D. on whether a person in
Jesus's situation has a constitutional right to raise his biological child.172 Then, I
specifically argue for the value of implementing an approach derived from the
2002 UPA and implemented in the District of Columbia.
The cast of characters in Michael H. v. Gerald D. begins with Carole and
Gerald, a married couple. Carole began an affair with Michael, and from that
relationship, Victoria was born in May 1981. Gerald was named as the father on
Victoria's birth certificate and held himself out as Victoria's father. For the next
three years, Carole and Victoria lived in a variety of households. For part of the
time, they lived with Michael, who held Victoria out as his child. They
subsequently lived with yet another man, after which Carole returned to her
husband, and then once again became involved with Michael. From August
1983 until May 1984, Carole, Michael, and Victoria lived together, and Michael
held Victoria out as his
child. In June 1984, Carole reconciled permanently with
73
her husband, Gerald.1

Carole and Gerald responded to Michael's action to be declared Victoria's
father by invoking the California statute permitting only a husband or wife, and
only until the child is two years old, to move for blood tests that might dislodge
the conclusive presumption that a husband living with his wife is the father of
her child.' 74 Michael challenged the constitutionality of that statute as applied
relationship with Victoria
to him, arguing that he had developed a father-child 175
and thus was constitutionally entitled to be her father.
In Lehr v. Robertson, a nonmarital father who had no relationship with his
two-year-old child was denied the opportunity to contest the child's adoption by
the man her mother subsequently married. 176 The Supreme Court upheld this
denial, articulating the following standard:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father
an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's develop-

171. For a more complete examination of state approaches to this issue, see Appleton, supra note 25,
at 234-36 & nn.33-39.
172. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
173. Id. at 113-15.
174. Id. at 115.
175. Id. at 124.
176. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983).
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ment. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically
17 7
compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.
Michael produced evidence of his relationship with Victoria, including that
they had lived in the same household, he had contributed to her support, and she
called him "Daddy."' 78 Thus, he argued, he met the "biology plus" test articulated in Lehr and was entitled to recognition as Victoria's father.
The Supreme Court upheld the California statute's applicability to Michael in
a 5-4 ruling with a plurality opinion by Justice Scalia. 179 The plurality rejected
the application of the "biology plus" test to these circumstances. Rather, it
emphasized that the child was born to a married couple who wished to raise the
child as their own.' 80 Invoking history and tradition, the plurality refused to
extend constitutional protection to a biological father's attempt to claim paternity of a child born to a married woman when that woman and her husband
wished to raise the child in a "unitary family."''
The plurality noted that protecting Michael's relationship with Victoria would,
by definition, deny protection to Gerald's relationship with her. 182 While the
dissent sought to provide Michael with the "freedom not to conform," the
plurality asserted that Gerald should equivalently have a "freedom to conform." '8 3 Then, in a sentence of critical importance to understanding the
significance of this opinion, the plurality stated, "[o]ur disposition does not
choose
, 4 between these two 'freedoms,' but leaves that to the people of Califor-

nia." 18

In other words, the Court did not hold that Gerald had a constitutional right to
be Victoria's father. Rather, a state could choose to recognize either man (or
both) as Victoria's father(s), and neither could raise a constitutional objection to
the state's choice. This leeway suggests that a state can establish its own rules
concerning the legal parentage of a child born to a married lesbian couple,
conceived through a sexual relationship that one spouse has with a man. This is
especially clear for a man who does not meet the "biology plus" test.
Jesus likely did not meet the "biology plus" test. He provided some prenatal
assistance when Melissa asked for it, but then he acquiesced in her return to
Irene and did not pursue any claim for parentage of M. when she was born. He
had less of a relationship with Melissa than Jonathan Lehr had with the mother

177. Id. at 262.
178. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 143-44.

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

110.
129.
129 & n.7.
130.

183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

184. Id.
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of his biological child.1 85 Had Melissa chosen to place M. for adoption, Jesus
would not have qualified as a presumed father and his consent to M.'s adoption
would not have been required. Under Lehr, there would have been no constitutional infirmity in that result.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly decided the issue raised in Kelsey
S., namely whether a nonmarital biological father who comes forward at the
moment of a child's birth has a constitutional right to be a parent if he is
blocked from developing the "plus" part of "biology plus" by the actions of the
child's mother.186 Jonathan Lehr alleged that his child's mother had concealed
herself and the child from him. The dissenting opinion, but not the majority,
noted this allegation.' 87 Because the Court upheld the statutory scheme under
which Lehr did not receive a hearing, there was never an adjudication of the
truth of this allegation. And because the majority did not need a resolution of
that factual dispute to determine the constitutionality of the New York scheme,
some courts have inferred that the "plus" in the "biology plus" is satisfied only
by actually developing a relationship with the child.' 8 8 Because Jesus did not
meet the Kelsey S. test, it is not necessary to go that far to reject any claim Jesus
might make to a constitutional right to be M.'s father
a. Uniform ParentageAct. Given the variation in existing state laws on the
legal status of a biological father of a child born to a married woman, the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) had
numerous options before it during its revision of the Uniform Parentage Act.
The 2002 UPA continues a parentage presumption for a man who is married to
the mother as well as for a man who "for the first two years of the child's
life ...resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the
child as his own."18' 9 Section 106 concerns determinations of maternity and
reads as follows: "Provisions of this [Act] relating to determination of paternity
apply to determinations of maternity." 90
The 1973 UPA on which California's statute is modeled did not contain a
time requirement for presumptive parentage based on "holding out." That is
why Irene met that standard. Under the 2002 UPA, Irene is not a presumptive
parent based on holding M. out as her child because she did not live with M. for
two years. She is, however, M.'s presumed mother by operation of her marriage
to Melissa.
NCCUSL had to evaluate the marital and "holding out" presumptions in light
of the fact that DNA testing can now determine with close to 100% certainty
185. Lehr lived with the mother for two years before the child was born and visited her every day
she was in the hospital after the child's birth. He also saw her and the child when he could locate them
dissenting).
and when she permitted it. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 269 (1983) (White, J.,
186. See Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Cal. 1992).
187. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
188. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d 1026, 1033 (Utah 2010).
189. UNIR.PARENTAGE AcT § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002).
190. Id. § 106 (alterations in original).
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whether a man is the biological father of a child. After weighing what it frankly
deemed "difficult issues,"' 9 ' NCCUSL determined that when a child has a
presumed parent, then the mother, presumed father, or another party who wants
to challenge that parentage must bring an action before the child's second
birthday. The only exception is if the couple was not cohabiting or having
sexual intercourse during the probable time of conception and the presumed
father never held the child out as his own. 192 In other words, even if the couple
was not living together or having sexual intercourse, if the husband holds the
child out as his own, the two-year limitation applies.
The comment to this section acknowledges that the majority of states allow
an "outsider" to the marriage to challenge a husband's parentage. 93 NCCUSL
rejected that result and sought a middle ground by limiting the opportunity for
challenges to two years.194
No state allowed same-sex couples to marry when the 2002 UPA was ratified.
Hence, there was no reason for NCCUSL to address the presumption of
parentage for a same-sex spouse. But under a gender-neutral reading pursuant to
§ 106, a woman married to a woman who gives birth is a presumptive parent.
Any challenge to her parentage must be brought before the child is two years
old. The exception that would allow a challenge beyond the two years applies
only if she never held the child out as her own. Because the 2002 UPA affirms
the parentage of a husband even if he could not have been the child's biological
father, as long as he holds the child out as his own, the same principle should
apply to a nonbiological mother.
The 2002 UPA contemplates that the parentage presumption will be rebutted
if genetic testing reveals that the husband is not the biological father of the
child. 195 But the ability to rebut the presumption, even in the first two years, is
not absolute. Under § 608, the court has the authority to deny a motion for
genetic testing, effectively leaving the presumption of parentage intact if, by
clear and convincing evidence, "(1) the conduct of the mother or the presumed
or acknowledged father estops that party from denying parentage; and (2) it
would be inequitable to disprove the father-child relationship between the child
and the presumed or acknowledged father." 196 The court is to consider the
child's best interests, including all of the following factors:
(1) the length of time between the proceeding to adjudicate parentage and the
time that the presumed or acknowledged father was placed on notice that
he might not be the genetic father;

191. Id. § 607 cmt.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. §§ 607(b)(1)-(2).
Id. § 607 cmt.

Id.
Id. § 63 1(1).
Id. § 608(a).
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(2) the length of time during which the presumed or acknowledged father has
assumed the role of father of the child;
(3) the facts surrounding the presumed or acknowledged father's discovery of
his possible nonpaternity;
(4) the nature of the relationship between the child and the presumed or
acknowledged father;
(5) the age of the child;
(6) the harm that may result to the child if presumed or acknowledged
paternity is successfully disproved;
(7) the nature of the relationship between the child and any alleged father;
(8) the extent to which the passage of time reduces the chances of establishing the paternity of another man and a child-support obligation in favor of
the child; and
(9) other factors that may affect the equities arising from the disruption of the
or acknowlfather-child relationship between the child and the presumed
197
edged father or the chance of other harm to the child.
The comment following this section notes that the most common situation in
which it expects a motion for genetic testing to be denied is when a presumed
but both he and the mother
father knows that the child is not his genetic child
19 8
father.
child's
the
as
role
his
accept
affirmatively
The spirit of this section of the UPA, if not the letter, is applicable to
same-sex couples. No genetic testing is necessary to disprove the biological
connection between the female spouse and the child.' 99 But the limitation on
genetic testing acknowledges that even when the child is young there are
instances in which the presumption of parentage should not be disturbed. Those
circumstances are directly transferable to a child born to a same-sex married
couple.
Running the In re M.C. facts through the 2002 UPA produces the following
result. Irene is M.'s presumed parent based on her marriage to Melissa. Either
Melissa or Jesus can file an action to rebut that presumption. The court need not
rebut the presumption, however, if it is satisfied by clear and convincing
evidence that the two-prong test in this section is met. Even if Melissa might be
estopped from denying Irene's parentage-a debatable result-Jesus can challenge her parentage. Under the statute, he can be blocked from doing so only if
Irene can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would be inequitable to

197. Id. § 608(b).
198. Id. § 608(b) cmt.
199. This is true in the ordinary situation. There are instances, however, in which one woman gives
birth to a child conceived using the egg of the other woman and donor semen. See, e.g., T.M.H. v
D.M.T., No. 5D09-3559, 2011 WL 6437247, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2011).
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disprove her parentage of M., considering, among other things, M.'s best
interests in light of the listed factors, several of which do not apply.
Irene acted as M.'s mother for a short time, which works in Jesus's favor. But
Jesus did not even meet M. until she was ten months old. Irene, on the other
hand, made a commitment to M. before her birth, evidenced by her participation
in prenatal care and her marriage to Melissa. The factors also demand that the
court consider the chance of harm to the child. At this point, the court can
properly consider that Melissa and Irene are not a family unit and that Irene has
a history of violence towards Melissa. The clear and convincing standard in the
2002 UPA places the burden of proof on Irene to demonstrate that her relationship with M. should preclude Jesus's parentage. It is unlikely she can meet this
burden, and the court would likely find that Jesus, and not Irene, is M.'s second
parent.
b. Districtof Columbia. In 2009, the District of Columbia revised its parentage statutes with lesbian couples in mind. When a child is born through donor
insemination, a person-including the birth mother's female partner-who
consents to that insemination with the intent to be a parent is a parent of the
resulting child. 200 That provision, of course, has no relevance to determining
parentage of a child conceived through sexual intercourse with a man.
An additional statutory revision created an explicit presumption of parentage
for a woman who is married to, or in a registered domestic partnership with, a
woman who bears a child. 20 The presumption is the same that attaches to a
man who is married to or in a registered domestic partnership with a woman
who bears a child.
If this presumption could be rebutted by anyone at any time on the basis of a
lack of genetic connection between a woman's female spouse/partner and her
child, then the presumption would be meaningless for a lesbian couple. Either
spouse could disestablish the nonbiological mother's parentage on that basis, as
could a biological father. The District of Columbia instead used as a jumping off
point the 2002 UPA, which allows the marital presumption to be challenged, but
only until a child's second birthday. Any challenge to the marital/domesticpartnership presumption, whether the spouse is male or female, must be brought
before the child's second birthday.20 2
In the 2002 UPA, lack of genetic connection does not automatically negate
the status of a presumptive parent. The UPA assumes that genetic testing is
necessary to disprove a spouse's parentage. Therefore, to implement the position that the marital presumption should not automatically be rebutted based on

200. D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1) (2009).
201. Id. §§ 16-909(a-1)(l)--(2). The District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction that allows both
same-sex and different-sex couples to choose either marriage or a marriage-equivalent status of

domestic partnership.
202. Id. § 16-2342(c).
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biology, the UPA gives the court the authority to deny a motion for genetic
testing.
This is an underinclusive approach even for heterosexual couples. The parties
involved can know that the child is another man's biological child without
genetic testing. For a lesbian couple, the presumption exists with full knowledge
that the spouse is not the biological parent. For these reasons, the D.C. statute
gives substantive instruction to the trial court concerning adjudication of parentage.
Lack of genetic connection overcomes the marital presumption. 0 3 But the
court does not stop there. The court is directed to try the question of the child's
parentage and can determine that the presumed parent is the child's parent after
giving due consideration to:
(A) Whether the conduct of the mother or the presumed parent should
preclude that party from denying parentage;
(B) The child's interests; and
(C) The duration and stability of the relationship
between the child, the
2 4
presumed parent, and the genetic parent. 0
Section A of this statute, like the estoppel related provisions of the UPA, is
irrelevant to a dispute between Irene and Jesus over M.'s parentage; even if
Melissa might be precluded from challenging Irene's parentage, Jesus can
challenge her. The court would therefore consider the remaining two factors.
Each claimant must present evidence of M.'s interests, a deliberately flexible
standard. The only other factor the court is instructed to weigh is the duration
and stability of each parent-child relationship. Unlike the UPA, the D.C. statute
does not place on the presumed parent the burden of proving the substantive
standard with clear and convincing evidence.
Under this standard, at the time of the trial court's parentage adjudication,
Jesus had no relationship with M. He saw her for the first time when she was ten
months old, just a couple of weeks before the court's hearing on parentage.
Irene did have a relationship with her. She stepped up to support Melissa during
the last half of her pregnancy, was present at M.'s birth, and cared for her on a
daily basis until the couple split up. The relationship was of short duration and
questionable stability, given that the split-up came when M. was less than a
month old, but Irene did immediately file a court petition to maintain that
relationship, which was all she could do after Melissa moved out.
Although Irene has an edge on that factor, the question of M.'s parentage in
the District of Columbia would almost certainly come down to an assessment
by the court as to what result is in M.'s best interest. Because the D.C. statute

203. Id. § 16-909(b)(1).
204. Id. §§ 16-909(b)(1)(A)-(C).
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explicitly acknowledges that a child can have two mothers, the court is not free
to base the child's interest on a preference for a one-mother/one-father model.
Because the statute explicitly acknowledges that biology does not trump the
marital presumption, the court is not free to base the child's interest on a
preference for the biological parent.
Once the child turns two, in the District of Columbia as well as under the
UPA, the existence of a biological parent outside the family unit is legally
irrelevant. For a younger child, however, the statute acknowledges that biology
does have significance, enough that it could possibly trump the parentage claim
of the birth mother's spouse even if they remain an intact family unit.
During Melissa's pregnancy, Jesus and his family played a supportive role for
as long as Melissa wanted. When she returned to Irene, Jesus's biological
connection to the impending child was insufficient to cause him to insist that the
child remain a part of his life and that of his family. He moved to Oklahoma,
presumably with little thought to the distance this would put between him and
the child and no expectation of a relationship with the child. Irene, on the other
hand, stepped up to assume parental responsibility. She demonstrated this by
marrying Melissa and by her participation in prenatal care and the birth and the
care of M. at the beginning of her life. This weighs in her favor.
That Melissa and Irene are no longer a family unit properly plays a role in
deciding M.'s parentage. There is no parentage determination that will provide
M. with a single home. In a different situation, where a biological father
challenges a female partner's parentage presumption but the lesbian couple
remains together, the child's interest in a stable home life counsels against
allowing biology to rebut the presumption.
The evidence of Irene's violence toward Melissa is an even more important
factor in this case. Melissa's charges against Irene were credible enough to
warrant a restraining order. Irene did not claim that the incidents were uncharacteristic and therefore unlikely to reoccur; rather she denied them entirely.
Melissa's psychological problems might create some skepticism about the
veracity of her claims, but the fact that one judge already issued a restraining
order should put the burden on Irene to show at this point that the violence did
not occur. Unless she can meet that burden, Irene's violence towards Melissa
weighs heavily against a determination that her parentage of M. is in M.'s best
interests. The court should also investigate Jesus for any evidence of domestic
violence in his present or past relationships.
D. DOES M. HAVE THREE PARENTS?

The final question is whether M. has three parents. Understandably, there has
been discontent among advocates for LGBT families about the holding that a
child cannot have three parents.2 °5 The holding is wrong and threatens to

205. Diane M. Goodman, Why Can't Children Have Three Parents?,L.A. LAW., Dec. 2011, at 36.
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undermine family structures that can work well for children. But it is possible to
overstate what the In re M.C. court got wrong. LGBT family law specialist
Diane Goodman wrote in the December 2011 Los Angeles Lawyer that "as a
result of [the In re M.C.] decision, this child will lose one of the adults that she
considers a parent. ' '20 6 Goodman concluded that the case "caused a child to lose
a relationship with a parental figure."2 7
This suggests that the In re M.C. court should have found that this child had
three parents. I am not convinced that is the correct result. M. is an infant. A
finding that she has three parents means she will divide her time either between
one home in Oklahoma and two in California, or, for as long as Melissa is in
jail, a home in Oklahoma, a home in California, and visitation time with a
mother in jail. If her primary residential home is in Oklahoma, she will have
little contact with either mother or with any grandparents.
Three is not inherently better than two just because some children of LGBT
parents are being raised successfully by three parents. I do not think we need to
or should find three parents for M. as a matter of principle-either the principle
that a child can have three parents or the principle that a woman's female
partner must be considered a parent. When there is evidence of agreement
among three adults and reason to believe the three adults will cooperate in
fostering an environment that is good for the child, LGBT family advocates
should argue forcefully in favor of multiple parents. When those elements are
lacking, they should be cautious. Indeed, indiscriminate support for multiple
parents may undermine the strong arguments for recognizing more than two
parents in those situations where it is warranted.
CONCLUSION: WHO ARE M.'s PARENTS?

Hard cases make bad law, and this was a hard case: a biological mother in
jail, with a long history of impaired judgment and mental-health and substanceabuse problems; a nonbiological mother who stepped up, as countless men have
done, and married a pregnant woman, but who had housing and job instability
and a history of domestic violence; a biological father who, as countless men
have also done, left behind a woman pregnant with his child to start a new life
elsewhere.
The case also made bad law, three times over. The court ruled categorically
that a child could not have three parents;20 8 it eviscerated the distinction
between a man who does all in his power to raise his biological child and one
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. An effort is underway to overturn this holding through legislation. In February 2012, state
senator Mark Leno, with an explicit reference to this case, introduced legislation that gives a judge the
power to determine that a child has three parents. See Press Release, Senator Mark Leno, Bill Clarifies a
Judge's Ability To Protect Best Interests of a Child Who Has Relationships with More Than Two
Parents (Feb. 24, 2012), available at http://sdO3.senate.ca.gov/news/2012-02-24-bill-clarifies-judge-sability-protect-best-interests-child-who-has-relationships-mo.
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who walks away from that child; and it implied that a woman bearing her own
genetic child could be eliminated as the child's parent without complying with
the statutory process for reuniting a child in foster care with his or her parents
and without the constitutionally mandated standard of clear and convincing
evidence of unfitness.
I have a hunch about this case, one that I will never be able to verify. I
suspect that the trial court, and the appeals court reviewing the record, considered Melissa the least suitable of the three adults to care for M. Finding three
parents gave the trial court the option to reduce Melissa's role in M.'s life. Once
the appeals court ruled that M. could not have three parents, it needed to
develop reasoning that would allow the trial court on remand to pick Irene and
Jesus as the two parents. What the trial court actually did on remand remains
under seal, and there has been no subsequent appeal that would reveal its
determination.
Given the general principles that guide me and the legal framework I
advocate, I would have a court adjudicate this case as follows: Melissa and
Irene start out as M.'s parents; Jesus does not. Jesus, however, can file a
parentage action on the basis of his biological connection to M. Once his
biological status is established, the court must determine whether he or Irene is
M.'s second parent. His biological tie should not automatically trump Irene's
status as M.'s presumed parent. Rather, the court should make a frank assessment of M.'s best interests, in which Jesus and Irene have equal footing. It
should look backward at the relationship-or lack thereof-between M. and
each contender, and it should look forward at M.'s prospects for a stable and
healthy childhood.
Because the trial court in In re M.C. did not follow this template, the
determination of M.'s placement in early 2010 was made without developing
the facts necessary to evaluate fully both Irene and Jesus. The discernible facts,
however, point towards giving Jesus an opportunity to develop the relationship
with M. that he once relinquished. A court determined in July 2009, before M.
entered foster care, that Irene's visitation with M. should be supervised, likely
because of her propensity to violence. I want to know more than the appellate
opinion and briefs reveal about the quality of those visits, about Irene's job and
housing status, and about the likelihood that her violence will reoccur.
I also want to know more about the quality of Jesus's relationship with his
fianc6e and about whether there is any reason to be concerned that he, too, may
resort to violence. If there is no such reason, and because of Melissa and Irene's
deficiencies, the court should withhold an ultimate determination of parentage
for six months and place M. with Jesus during that period. Because Jesus is in
Oklahoma, M.'s contact with Irene and Melissa will be limited during those six
months. But that is the lesser evil in this case, which aims to provide M. with a
permanent home that will best serve her interests. If M. thrives in those six
months, and Jesus does well with responsibility for both M. and the child his
fianc6e will bear, he should be found M.'s parent.
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During that six month period, Melissa should receive the reunification services to which she is entitled. She may be released from jail, and she should
have the opportunity for the mental-health and substance-abuse treatment she
needs. At the end of six months, the court has one more decision to make.
Melissa's ability to parent may improve with services, or it may deteriorate in
spite of those services. Assuming Irene retains an interest in parenting M. and
that there is reason to believe this would be good for M., the court should have
the option of continuing the status quo for an additional six months. After
Melissa receives twelve months of reunification services, there will be evidence
about her ability to parent, and it will be appropriate to terminate her parental
rights if she can be proven unfit by clear and convincing evidence. Then, and
only then, Irene could be declared M.'s second parent.
This could leave the decision on M.'s parentage in limbo for a year. That is
not ideal, but if she thrives with Jesus, then the question of whether Melissa or
Irene is her second parent can await determination. Once a final determination is
made, the juvenile court need not stay involved; the case becomes a private
dispute between Jesus and either Melissa or Irene, in which Jesus receives sole
custody and Melissa or Irene has some amount of supervised or unsupervised
visitation. If either Melissa or Irene is not a parent, then her continuing contact
with M. lies within the discretion of M.'s parents.
To be clear, the resolution I propose here is based on the facts in this case. In
a different case, a man in Jesus's position who relocated and made no effort to
assert parental status until the child was over six months old would not prevail
over a nonbiological mother coparenting with the child's biological mother; the
court would weigh his claim based on biology with the claim of the presumed
mother who had functioned pre- and post-birth as the child's parent and, if
warranted on the facts, find the nonbiological mother, not the father, a parent. A
statutory scheme like that provided in the District of Columbia, building on the
framework of the current UPA, would allow for such a result. And under
different circumstances, of course, I would find all three adults to be parents, a
result the law should allow.
If I had used the facts of In re M.C. to develop a final exam question for my
family law course, my students would have thought I had an overactive
imagination. Once again, the complicated lives of real people prove a reminder
that family law must account for heterogeneity rather than pretend that there is
one family form that can be neatly circumscribed. Same-sex couples, male and
female, will raise children conceived through sexual intercourse. Examining
what the In re M.C. court got right, and what it got wrong, should aid in
developing the guidelines, through statutes and case law, for assessing parentage in those, and other complex, families.

